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Stochastic dominance, risk and disappointment:
a synthesis.
January 2016
Thierry Chauveau**
ABSTRACT: In this article, utilities are substituted for monetary values in the
denition of second order stochastic dominance (SSD). Doing so yields a family of
preorders induced by SSD among which one is the "closest" to the original preorder
of preferences. The corresponding utility function is the most likely to be that of
the decision maker. It may be dened before behavioural axioms are set. Theories
of decision making under risk can then be restated in a more general and consistent
way. As an example, a new theory of disappointment is developed, which is endowed
with three important properties: (a) risk premia are invariant by translation, (b)
when constant marginal utility is assumed, preferences are represented by a functional
which is the opposite to a convex measure of risk and (c) the functional representing
preferences and the utility function can be easily elicited through experimental testing.
RESUME: Une fonction dutilité est une bijection des loteries "ordinaires" sur des
loteries où des "utilités" auront été substituées aux revenus monétaires. On peut dénir
une dominance stochastique de second ordre sur ces loteries qui est "subjective" parce
quelle dépend de la fonction retenue. Parmi les préordres induits par ces dominances
stochastiques, il en est un qui est le plus "proche" des préférences de lagent économique
considéré. Il correspond à une fonction dutilité qui apparaît comme étant la plus
vraisembable pour décrire le comportement de lagent; elle peut être déterminée avant
que soit mise en place un jeu daxiomes caractérisant la rationalité des choix en univers
risqué. Nimporte quelle théorie de la décision peut alors être reformulée compte tenu
de ce que cette fonction dutilité doit être celle de lagent. A titre dapplication, nous
reformulons une théorie de la déception où la fonctionnelle représentant les préférences
est "loterie-dépendante". Cette théorie possède trois propriétés très intéressantes : (a)
les primes de risque sont invariantes par translation (b) la fonctionnelle représentant les
préférences nest autre que lopposé dune mesure convexe de rique (Föllmer et Schied
2002), si lutilité marginale de la richesse est constante et (c) lon peut déterminer la
fonction dutilité élémentaire à partir de tests empiriques.
JEL classication: D81.
KEY-WORDS: disappointment, risk-aversion, expected utility, risk premium, stochastic
dominance, subjective risk.
MOTS-CLES: déception, aversion pour le risque, risque subjectif, prime de risque, utilité
espérée.
* This paper is a revised version of the paper entitled "Risk, stochastic dominance
and disappointment: a synthesis", which was presented at the 2014 FUR conference
in Rotterdam (1st July) and at the 2015 SAET conference in Cambridge (UK, July
28th).
** Université Paris-I-Panthéon-Sorbonne. e-mail: thchauveaudevallat@gmail.com
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1 Introduction
According to expected utility theory henceforth EU theory, a decision
maker maximizes the expected utility of his wealth. He is risk-averse (prone) if
his utility function is concave (convex). Risky outcomes then exhibit positive
(negative) premia. Despite its appealingness, this result remains questionable
since it may be argued that, whatever his attitude towards risk, the EU decision
maker actually behaves in the same way. Indeed, in all cases, he takes into
account nothing but the average value of random welfares. In particular, he
will be indi¤erent between a certain welfare U and a risky welfare U whose
expected value E [U ] is equal to U. Finally, when utils are taken into account
instead of monetary values, the EU decision maker seems to behave as if he were
indi¤erent between the two branches of an alternative, one of which is clearly
less risky than the other.
A way of making this paradox vanish is to consider that risk aversion (prone-
ness) exists if and only if henceforth i¤ the risk premium E [U ] U is positive
(negative). This will be the case if preferences are dened over random utilities,
what will be done in this article. It will make sense because the utility function
will have been dened before the axioms characterizing the behaviour of the
decision maker are set. The utility function will be derived from comparing the
preorder of preferences % to the preorders induced by subjective second order
stochastic dominance henceforth SSSD.
SSSD is just the same as the usual second order stochastic dominance 
henceforth SSDexcept that the utility of an outcome is then substituted for
its monetary value. Of course, the denition of SSSD depends on the considered
utility function u(:). It will be labelled <u2 . Like SSD, it is a partial preorder.
In principle, violations of SSSD must be ruled out when the decision maker
is rational and risk-averse. Hence we shall focus on preorders induced by SSSD
which never disagree with %. It will be shown that, among the utility functions
characterizing these preorders, there exists one function such that the size of the
subset of pairs of lotteries for which % and <u2 are in accordance is the largest.
This utility function is clearly the most likely to be that of the decision maker.
Once the utility function has been dened, the decision maker may be viewed
as making a risky choice among random utilities, i.e. among random variables
whose consequences are valued in utils. Behavioural axioms may then be set.
As an example, we develop an original theory of disappointment. The reason
for this is both psychological and economic.
It is often emphasized, in psychological literature, that (a) disappointment
(elation) is experimented, once a decision has been taken, when the chosen
option turns out to be worse (better) than expected (see e.g. Mellers 2000), (b)
that it is the most frequently experimented emotion (see Weiner et alii 1979)
and (c) that disappointment is the most powerful among the negative emotions
which are experimented (see Schimmack and Diener 1997).1 Moreover, as Frijda
1There is a lot of empirical evidence which supports this view (see e.g. Van Dijk and Van
der Pligt 1996, Zeelenberg et alii 2002, Van Dijk et alii 2003).
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(1994) points out, actual emotion, a¤ective response, anticipation of future
emotion can be regarded as the primary source of decisions. To sum up, it
is most likely that expected elation/disappointment plays an important role in
decision making.
This role was rst formalized independently by Bell (1985) and Loomes and
Sugden (1986). Despite its earliness, their approach has revealed surprisingly
close to the analyses mentioned above. However, their disappointment models
have been somewhat neglected in the economic literature, probably because they
lack an axiomatic framework.
In the meantime, other disappointment models have been developed. Un-
fortunately, most of them also lack an axiomatic basis. A major exception is
Gul (1991) who developed an implicit expected utility model of disappointment
where the certainty equivalent of the lottery plays the role of reference level.
However, Guls theory does not guarantee that the utility function which is
derived from his axiomatic is the most likely to be that of the decision maker.
In contrast, our theory of disappointment has been developed in order to
meet this property. It will be called LS-theory since it generates a set of mod-
els called LS-modelswhich are close to that of Loomes and Sugden (1986)
although the utility function of the decision-maker is now lottery-dependent.2
LS-theory also meets four other important properties: (a) risk premia are invari-
ant by translation;3 (b) in particular, when constant marginal utility is assumed,
preferences are represented by a functional which is nothing but the opposite to
a convex measure of risk (Föllmer and Schied 2002); (c) quantities of risk are
identied to centered moments of the distribution of the utility of the decision
makers wealth. The global risk premium is then a sum of elementary risk pre-
mia, each of which is the product of a quantity of risk by a specic coe¢ cient of
risk aversion. When the functional is quadratic, the risk premium comes down
to the product of the variance of the utility of the decision makers wealth by
risk aversion; (d) the functional representing preferences and the utility function
can be easily elicited through experimental testing.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: in Section 2, new concepts
(subjective stochastic dominances, subjective risk,...) will be introduced and
it will be shown how a utility function can be derived from preferences over
random utilities. In the next sections, a theory of disappointment is developed:
Section 3 is devoted to the study of the particular case of constant marginal
utility. In Section 4, the general theory is presented. Section 5 concludes.
2Since the independence property is met only for lotteries exhibiting the same expected
utility.
3Unless constant marginal utility is assumed, risk premia are valued in utils and the in-
variance property matches this denition.
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2 How to derive a utility function from prefer-
ences
2.1 Denitions
In this article, the decision maker is assumed to face a problem of risky
choice over a set X = fX;Y; Z; :::g of random variables mapping a set of "states
of nature" 
 on to a set of outcomes which is identied to an interval [a; b] of
R. The outcomes are identied to monetary prizes. An element of X will be
called a lottery. Any lottery X 2X is endowed with a probability distribution.
The subset of these probability distributions will be labelled L. A probability
distribution will be identied to its cumulative distribution function henceforth
c.d.f.. The c.d.f. of X is labelled FX (x) and its expected value E [X]. The
random variable whose outcome is x with certainty, will be labelled x.
When the set of events is nite, a random variableX 2 X has a nite support
fx1; x2; :::; xNg where x1 < x2 < ::: < xN ; it will be called a simple lottery and
labelled: X =[x1; x2; :::; xN ; p1; p2; :::; pN ] where pn = Pr (X = xn)  0 andPN
n=1 pn = 1.
A decision-maker has a preference relation over X. His preferences will be
denoted % (weak preference). The acronym  () will be used for strong pref-
erence (indi¤erence). The certainty equivalent of X 2X is the certain outcome
which is indi¤erent to X. It is labelled c (X) (i.e. X  c(X)).
A utility function will be dened as a derivable increasing function mapping
[a; b] on to [0; 1].4 Actually, utility functions will also be assumed to be convex or
concave over [a; b]. However, this assumption will be relaxed later (See Appendix
1). The subset of utility functions will be labelled U.
A utility function u (:) may also be viewed as dening a one-to-one corre-
spondance mapping X on to U where U= fU; V; :::g is the set of random variables
mapping 
 on to [0; 1]. An element of U is dened by: U = u (X); it will be
called a u-lottery. The c.d.f. of U 2 U will be labelled GU (:), its certainty
equivalent c (U) and its expected value E [U ] =
R 1
0
zdGU (z).
Finally, recall that stochastic dominances are partial pre-ordering relations
over X, which are dened as follows:
X <n Y () FnX(x)  FnY (x) and F kX(b)  F kY (b) , 8x 2 [a; b] 8k  n  1:
where X <n Y stands for "X dominates Y by n-th order stochastic dominance"
and where
F 1X(x)
def
= FX(x) ; FnX(x)
def
=
R x
a
Fn 1X (t)dt,
The acronym n will be substituted for <n when the dominance is strict.
In particular, the partial preorder induced by rst-order (second order) sto-
chastic dominance (henceforth FSD (SSD)) are characterized by the following
equivalences
X <1 Y () FX(x)  FY (x) 8x 2 [a; b] :
X <2 Y ()
R x
a
(FX(t)  FY (t)) dt  0; 8x 2 [a; b] :
4As a consequence, one may say that it is normalized. The reason for such a choice will
become apparent later.
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A particular case of stochastic dominance is an increase in risk (see Ekern
1980) which is dened as follows:
X <Rn Y () FnX(x)  FnY (x) and F kX(b) = F kY (b), 8 x 2 [a; b] 8 k  n  1:
where X <Rn Y stands for "Y is a nth-degree increase in risk over X". For
example, a 2nd-degree increase in risk coincides with a mean preserving spread,
(see Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970).
2.2 Subjective stochastic dominances and subjective risk
Some new concepts are now going to be dened: that of subjective stochastic
dominance and that of subjective risk.
Denition 1 (subjective stochastic dominance). Let u(:) be a utility
function, let X
i
2X and let Ui = u (Xi) for i = 1; 2. It is equivalent to state
that:
(a) X
1
dominates X2 by SFSD (SSSD) or that
(b) U1 dominates U2 by FSD (SSD).
Denition 2. (subjective risk) Let u(:) be a utility function, let Xi 2X
and let Ui = u (Xi) for i = 1; 2. It is equivalent to state that:
(a) X
2
is a second degree increase in subjective risk over X1 or that
(b) U
2
is a second degree increase in risk over U1, (i.e. U2 is a mean preserving
spread of U
1
).
From now on, SFSD (SSSD) will be labelled <u1 (<u2 ).The acronym un will
be substituted for <un when the dominance is strict (for n = 1; 2). As already
indicated in the introductory section, the SSSD property is just the same as
the usual SSD property except that the utility of any outcome, namely u(x), is
substituted for its monetary value, namely x, in the corresponding tests. SSSD
may be characterized as follows:
Proposition 1 (characterization of SSSD). Let (X1 ; X2) 2X X. Let
u(:) be a utility function and let Ui = u (Xi) for i = 1; 2. It is equivalent to
state:
(a) X
1
<u2 X2 or
(b)
R z
a
u0 (x) (FX1 (x)  FX2 (x))dx  0 for any z 2 [a; b].
Proof. It is given in Appendix 4.
Clearly, the denitions of subjective stochastic dominance and of subjective
risk depend on the considered utility function u(:). Hence, the SSD and the
SSSD dominance properties are not necessarily met simultaneously.5 As a con-
sequence, one can dene Xu+2 (X
u 
2 ) as the subset of pairs of lotteries (X1; X2)
over which the two preorders, <u2 and % coincide (disagree), what formally
reads:
Xu+2 = f(X1; X2) 2 X X j X1 <u2 X2 and X1 % X2g and
Xu 2 = f(X1; X2) 2 X X j X1 <u2 X2 and X2  X1g.
5However, FSD dominance is a property which is conservative through the change of ran-
dom variable: Y = u (X) since, by assumption, u0 (:) is positive.
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2.3 Closeness to the preorder of preferences
Intuitively, the preorder <u2 will be all the more "close" to the total preorder
% that the size of Xu 2 is smaller and that the size of Xu+2 is larger i.e. that
violations of SSSD are more scarce and that the two preorders more often agree.
Consequently, we set the following denition:
Denition 3. The preorder <u2 is closer to the total preorder % than the
preorder <v2 i¤ either:
(a) Xu 2  Xv 2 or:
(b) Xu 2 = X
v 
2 and X
v+
2  Xu+2 .
The acronym "<u2 Cl <v2" will stand for "<u2 is closer to % than <v2".
It is obviously a partial preorder. The scarcity of SSSD violations is clearly
favoured, in the above denition, at the expense of the frequency of the concor-
dances of the two preorders. An important result then consists in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. Let u(:) and v(:) be two utility functions: if u(:) is more
concave (i.e. less convex) than v(:), then:
X1 <v2 X2 ) X1 <u2 X2 (1)
or, equivalently:
Xv+2  Xu+2 and Xv 2  Xu 2
Proof. It is given in Appendix 4.
As indicated in the above proposition, making a utility function more con-
cave increases the size of Xu+2 and, simultaneously, that of X
u 
2 . In other words,
increasing the size of Xu+2 will often be obtained at the expense of increasing
the size of Xu 2 for instance making X
u 
2 become non-empty.
As a consequence, making a utility function more concave will be desirable
only when the function is convex enough. Symmetrically, when the utility func-
tion is markedly concave, violations of SSSD will increase if the function is made
still more concave.
Finally, making utility functions become more and more concave will make
their associate preorders <u2 become closer and closer to % as far as the utility
functions remain convex enough. This will be the case if they remain consistent,
in the sense given below:
Denition 4 (consistency). A utility function is consistent i¤ the preorder
<u2 never disagrees with the preorder of preferences, what formally reads: Xu 2 =
?. The subset of consistent (inconsistent) utility functions will be labelled Uc
(UI).
Denition 4 clearly implies that the subset of consistent utility functions is
such that a preorder associated with a consistent function is closer to % than
any preorder associated with an inconsistent function, what formally reads:
u(:) 2 Uc and v(:) 2 UI =)<u2 Cl <v2
We may then focus on consistent utility functions and look for a consistent
utility function u(:), such that Xu+2 is as large as possible. As a preliminary,
note that Proposition 2 and Denition 4 imply the following corollary:
6
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Corollary 1. Let u(:) and v(:) be two consistent utility functions such that
u(:) is more concave (i.e. less convex) than v(:), then the following relations are
valid:
X1 <v2 X2 =) X1 <u2 X2 (2)
Xv+2  Xu+2 and Xv 2 = Xu 2 = ?
Proof. Corollary 1 is a direct consequence of Proposition 2 and of Denition
4.
The above result is going to be used to dene a new concept: that of likely
utility function.
2.4 Likely utility functions.
Actually, we get the following result which applies to consistent utility func-
tions.
Proposition 3. (likely utility function). There exists a unique consistent
utility function u(:) such that the preorder <u2 is the closest to the preorder of
preferences % among the preorders induced by consistent utility functions, what
formally reads:
8u(:) 2 Uc; <u2 Cl <u2 (3)
where Uc is the subset of consistent utility functions. It is the superior enveloppe
of the consistent concave or convex utility functions. It will be called the likely
utility function of the decision maker.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix 4..
If violations of (standard) SSD occur,6 any concave utility function must be
inconsistent, otherwise Proposition 2 would not hold. In contrast, violations of
SSSD will vanish for a convex enough function and the likely utility function is
convex.
If violations of (standard) SSD do not occur, then concave consistent utility
functions do exist and the likely utility function is concave. A geometrical
illustration of the above discussion is given on Figures 1A and 1B.
Finally a likely utility function is concave or convex, what may be viewed
as a too strong property. However, Proposition 3 may be slightly modied to
allow for piecewise concave or convex likely utility functions. To spare space,
this generalization is postponed until Appendix 1.
Anyway, according to Proposition 3, the likely utility function is such that
Xu+2 is as large as possible. It is the most likely to be the actual utility function
of the decision maker since it provides the "best" consistency with the preorder
of preferences. This result is all the more interesting that, as will be shown in
Appendix 3, the likely utility function of a decision maker can be elicited from
binary choices over simple lotteries.
6Recall that although violations of SSSD are ruled out for the preorders associated with
consistent utility functions, violations of (standard) SSD may occur even though the subset
of consistent utility functions is not empty.
7
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A last remark is that assuming that utility functions are normalized, what
has been made at the beginning of this article, is not really restrictive. Indeed,
if u (:) is as concave (or, equivalently, as convex) as v (:), or, equivalently, if
u (:) is an a¢ ne and increasing function of v (:), then <u2 is as close to % as
<v2. Indeed, we are interested in nothing but the equivalence classes of the
binary relation "u (:) is as concave (or, equivalently, as convex) as v (:)". A set
of class representatives will consist in a subset of utility functions meeting the
same two normalization conditions, which have been particularized as u(a) =
0 and u(b) = 1.
Finally, from the analysis developed above, we get that a rational investor
is endowed with a likely utility function. It will be labelled u (:).
2.5 A generalized EU theory
A simple way of generalizing EU theory consists in substituting utils for
monetary values in its axiomatic. Preferences over u-lotteries (labelled %u) are
then canonically dened by the following equivalence:
X1 % X2 () U1 %u U2
where Ui = u (Xi) for i = 1; 2. The axioms of EU theory may then be modied
as indicated below:
Axiom I (ordering of %u). The binary relation %u is a total preorder
over the set U of u-lotteries.
Axiom II (continuity of %u). For any u-lottery the sets {Z 2 U j
Z %u U} and {Z 2 U j U %u Z} are closed in the topology of weak convergence.
Axiom III (independence axiom). The following implications hold:
8U1; U2; U3 2 U; 8 2 [0; 1] ; U2 u U3 =) U1  (1  )U2 u U1 +
(1  )U3
8U1; U2; U3 2 U; 8 2 [0; 1] ; U2 u U3 =) U1  (1  )U2 u U1 +
(1  )U3
As a consequence, we get the well-known following representation theorem:
Proposition 4. (expected utility representation theorem for %u
over U). Under Axioms I to III, the preorder of preferences of a rational
decision-maker labelled %ucan be represented over U by the following lottery-
dependent functional:
V (U) def=
Z 1
0
v (z) dGU (z) = E [v (U)] (4)
where v (:) is a continuous and increasing function which is dened up to an
increasing a¢ ne function.
Proof. See Fishburn (1970) 
From now on, the two normalization conditions v (0) = 0 and v (1) = 1 will
be assumed to be met, and, consequently, function v (:) will be unique and well
dened. Finally, note that (4) may be rewritten as:
U (X) def=
Z b
a
v (u (x)) dFX (x) = E [v(u (X))] (5)
8
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The function vu (:) is clearly continuous and increasing. It may be concave,
convex or neither concave nor convex7 and it is interesting to point out that,
because of its exibility, the functional (5) is compatible with some of the well-
kown anomalies of nancial theory. However, this issue is beyond the scope of
this article.
Unfortunately, the above generalized EU theory is not endowed with all the
suitable properties of a theory of decision making under risk: in particular, it
does not allow for risk premia invariance by translation.8 As a consequence,
we have developped an alternative theory which is nothing but a new theory of
disappointment.
3 Disappointment with constant marginal util-
ity
To make things clearer, we rst focus on a particular case: that of constant
marginal utility. Because of the normalization conditions, the likely utility func-
tion will be dened as: u (x) = (x  a)=(b  a). A decision maker will now care
for monetary outcomes.
3.1 The axiomatic of a simplied theory of disappoint-
ment
Preferences may then be indi¤erently dened over X or over U since the two
sets may now be identied.9 As a consequence, the new theory includes the two
rst axioms of EU theory. They may be stated as indicated below.
Axiom 1. (ordering of %) The binary relation % is a total preorder over
X.
Axiom 2. (continuity of %) For any lottery X 2 X the sets {Z 2 X j
Z % X} and {Z 2 X j X % Z} are closed in the topology of weak convergence.
As usual, elation (disappointment) will occur when the realized outcome x
is higher (lower) than a reference level x. The reference level may be viewed
as a "prior expectation" of the value of the lottery, which is likely to be an
average of ex-post outcomes, for instance their expected value E [X]. Elation or
disappointment will then depend on the spread x E [X].
Equivalently, one can say that the certainty equivalent of a lottery will be
its expected value minus a risk premium which is the expectation of a function
of the spread, E [E(X  E [X])]. The premium will be negative (positive) if the
decision maker is risk-averse (prone). As a consequence, the certainty equivalent
of the (; 1  )-mixing of two lotteries exhibiting the same expected value x =
E [X], will be the corresponding convex combination of the certainty equivalents
of the two considered lotteries. Hence, the following axiom will be set.
7 In the last case, it may be piecewise concave/convex.
8This drawback is shared by almost all theories of decision making under risk.
9Since they are isomorphic through the change of variable: U = u(X):
9
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Axiom 3. (linearity of certainty equivalents of lotteries belong-
ing to Xx) The certainty equivalent of the (; 1  )-mixing of two lotteries
exhibiting the same expected value is the (; 1  )-convex combination of their
certainty equivalents, what formally reads:
8X;Y 2 Xx; 8 2 [0; 1] ; c (X  (1  )Y ) = c (X) + (1  ) c (Y )
where Xx = fX 2 X jE [X] = xg.
The axiom clearly implies that the independence property is met over any
subset of lotteries exhibiting the same expected value. However, the independence
property is weaker than the above linearity property since the degenerate lottery
 (X  (1  )Y ) does not belong to Xx. Anyway, the above axioms imply the
following result:
Proposition 5. Under Axioms 1 to 3, the total preorder of preferences of
a decision maker % may be represented over Xx by a continuous real-valued
function Ux(:) which is linear, i.e.:
8X;Y 2 Xx; 8 2 [0; 1] ; Ux (X  (1  )Y ) =Ux (X) + (1  )Ux (Y ) (6)
Furthermore Ux(:) is dened up to an a¢ ne and positive transformation.
Proof. Since the subset Xx is a mixture set, the same proof as the one given
in Fishburn (1970) may be used.
Actually, as shown in the next proposition, a stronger result is available.
Proposition 6 (expected utility representation theorem for  over
Xx). Under Axioms 1 to 3, the functional Ux(:) may be dened as:
Ux (X) def=
Z b
a
ux(x)dFX(x) (7)
where ux(:) is a continuous and increasing function mapping [a; b] on to [ux(a);
ux(b)] which is dened up to an a¢ ne and positive transformation.
Proof. If only simple lotteries were considered, the three above axioms
would clearly be su¢ cient for the above proposition to hold. Actually, the
proposition holds even when the whole set Xx is taken into account. The proof
is given in Appendix 4. Note that neither a dominance axiom nor a monotonicity
axiom need then to be set.
We now set the following normalization conditions:
ux(x) = x and  (x)ux(b) + (1   (x))ux(a) = c(Xx) (8)
where:
Xx
def
= [a; 1   (x) ; b;  (x)] ;  (x) def= (x  a) = (b  a) :
As a consequence, ux(:) is, from now on, unique and well dened. However,
the above results do not provide a method for comparing two lotteries whose ex-
pected values di¤er because it is not guaranteed that the values of the functional
representing the preferences over Xx (i.e. Ux(:)) are compatible with those of
the functional representing the preferences over Xy (i.e. Uy(:)). However, since
10
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Axiom 3 is stronger than what would have been a weakened independence axiom
yielding only the independence property over Xx, this does occur.
Indeed, let X 2 Xx and  be dened by: X  x  (1  )Xx. Then x
(X) clearly SSD dominates X (Xx). As a consequence, we have x  X  Xx
and  belongs to [0; 1].
Finally, the certainty equivalent of X is equal to :
c (X) = c (x  (1  )Xx).
Next, Axiom 3 implies that: c (X) = c (x) + (1  ) c (Xx),
and, thanks to the normalization conditions (8) that:
c (X) = Ux (x) + (1  )Ux (Xx).
Moreover, Proposition 4 implies that:
Ux (x  (1  Xx)) = Ux (x) + (1  )Ux (Xx)
and, consequently: Ux (X) = c (X)
or, equivalently:
UE[X] (X) = c (X) (9)
Finally, we are well able to compare lotteries whose expected values di¤er as
indicated in the following proposition:
Proposition 7. (lottery-dependent expected utility representation
theorem for % over X) Under Axioms 1 to 3, the preorder of preferences %
may be represented over X by the following lottery-dependent functional:
U (X) def= UE[X] (X) =
Z b
a
uE[X](x)dFX(x) (10)
where uE[X](x) is continuous and increasing with respect to x and meets the
normalizing conditions (8)
Proof. Eq (9) implies that U(:) well represents the preorder of preferences
% over X. 
Unfortunately, the above functional remains far too general. Hence, in the
next subsection we particularize uE[X](:) to provide a more operational specica-
tion. This will be done through imposing an additional condition to preferences:
the invariance of risk premia by translation.
3.2 Invariance of risk premia by translation
The risk premium of an arbitrary lottery X 2 X then reads:
RP(X)
def
= E [X]  c (X) = E [X] 
Z b
a
uE[X](x)dFX(x)
It is commonly assumed, in the literature dealing with banking regulation,
that risk premia should be invariant by translation, i.e., that
RP(X + x) = RP(X)
This invariance property is guaranteed by the following necessary and su¢ -
cient condition.
11
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Proposition 8. The risk premium of an arbitrary lottery X 2 X is endowed
with the property of invariance by translation i¤:
ux(x) = x+ E (x  x)
where E(:) is continuous and increasing and meets the following requirements:
E (0) = 0 ; x  a
b  a (b+ E (b  x)) +
b  x
b  a (a+ E (a  x)) = c (Xx) (11)
Proof. It is given in Appendix 4.
From now on, an elation function will be dened as a continuous and increas-
ing function E(:) which meets the above requirements. Its opposite D(:)=  E(:)
will be called a disappointment function. Finally, we shall set the following
denition:
Denition 5 (rational decision maker). A decision maker is rational if
he obeys Axioms 1 to 3 and if risk premia are invariant by translation.
As a consequence, the following corollary is valid.
Corollary 2. The preorder of the preferences of a rational decision maker
are represented over X by the following lottery-dependent functional:
U(X) = E[X] 
Z b
a
D(x E[X])dFX(x) (12)
where D(:) is a disappointment function.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Propositions 7 and 8.
Conversely, if D(:) is a disappointment function, the corresponding func-
tional U(:) may be viewed as representing the preferences of a rational decision
maker.
3.3 Risk-averse decision makers
Now consider risk-averse decision makers. According to Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970), a decision-maker is risk-averse if he prefers X to any mean
preserving spread of X.10 In particular, any non-degenerate lottery X 2 X
will exhibit a positive risk premium if X is not degenerate, giving rise to the
following equivalence:
X non degenerate()
Z b
a
D(x E[X])dFX(x) = E [D (X  E [X])] > 0 (13)
and the consistency of risk and risk aversion is guaranteed by the next proposi-
tion:
10Risk aversion in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz is more often denominated strong
risk aversion whereas weak risk aversion characterizes the behaviour of a decision-maker who
always prefers E[X] to X. Strong risk aversion clearly implies weak risk aversion which, in
its turn, implies that risk premia are positive.
12
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Proposition 9. A rational decision maker is risk-averse i¤ his preferences
are represented by a functional U(:) dened by (12) where D(:) is a strictly
convex disappointment function.
Proof. If D(:) is strictly convex, then (13) will hold. This is a direct
consequence of Jensens inequality. Conversely, if (13) holds for all X 2 X ,
then D(:) must be strictly convex.11 
Two other denitions of the consistency of risk and risk aversion may be
considered. According to the rst one, a risk premium should depend positively
on a quantity of risk and on risk aversion. For instance, a risk premium is often
dened as the product of risk by risk aversion.
In the new theory, if the disappointment function is innitely derivable, the
risk premium of X may be rewritten as:
RP (X) =
P+1
p=2E [(X  E [X])p]D(p) (0) =p! (14)
The risk premium RP(X) is now an innite sum of elementary premia each
of which is the product of two terms: the pth order centered moment of the
random variable X, which is nothing but a quantity of risk, and D(p) (0) =p!
which characterizes the magnitude of risk aversion. If a rational decision maker
is averse to any nth-degree increase in risk i.e. if he prefers X to Y whenever Y
is a nth-degree increase in risk over X, then sgn(D(p) (0)) = ( 1)p (See Jouini
et al. 2013.) his preferences may be represented by the following functional:
U(X) = E[X] P+1p=2 ( 1)pApE [(X  E [X])p] (15)
where Ap def= ( 1)pD(p) (0) =p! > 0. The above equation may be viewed as a
theoretical grounding of the multimoment approach of the Capital Asset Pricing
Model.
The last denition of the consistency between risk and risk aversion states
that preferences should be represented by a monotonous function of a measure
of risk à la Artzner et alii (1997).12 The invariance of risk premia by translation
is a desirable feature of a coherent measure of risk. Unfortunately, theories of
decision making under risk do not generally imply such a result. In contrast,
this theory of disappointment does. Indeed one may set:
r(X) =  U(X) =  E[X] +
Z b
a
D(x E[X])dFX(x)
and, since D(:) is convex, r(X) appears as a convex measure of risk of X in
the sense of Föllmer and Schied (2002).13 Hence, the above equality allows for
grounding a convex measure of risk on a theory of the behaviour of economic
11See e.g. K. Lange Applied Probability Springer (2003):
12Who dene a measure of risk as the minimum amount of money which must be added to
a risky portfolio (or a risky position) to make the risk incurred by the owner of the portfolio
(or the holder of the position) acceptable by a risk controller.
13The proof of this statement may be found in Chauveau Th. and St.Thomas (2015):
Valuing non-quoted CDS with consistent default probabilities, unpublished manuscript.
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agents towards risk. The risk controller is then assumed to be a risk-averse
rational decision maker with constant marginal utility.
To sum up, we have developed a fully choice-based theory of disappoint-
ment which clearly may give rise to many applications in Finance. However,
the assumption of constant marginal utility is obviously too restrictive and,
consequently, we now turn to the general case of variable marginal utility. The
corresponding theory will be developped in the next section, including a new
axiomatic which will be nothing but a slightly modied version of the present
one.
4 A general theory of disappointment with lot-
tery dependent utility
We go back to the framework developed for the presentation of the generalized
EU theory. A rational risk averse investor will be endowed with a likely utility
function u (:) and we again use this result to set a new axiomatic over utilities.
4.1 The axiomatic
The two rst axioms are still those of the generalized EU theory (See axioms
I and II above). However, the third axiom now reads:
Axiom III. (linearity of certainty equivalents of u-lotteries belong-
ing to Uu)
The certainty equivalent of the (; 1  )-mixing of two u-lotteries which
exhibit the same expected value is the corresponding convex combination of their
certainty equivalents, what formally reads:
8U1; U2 2 Uu; 8 2 [0; 1] ; c (U1  (1  )U2) = c (U1) + (1  ) c (U2)
where Uu = fU 2 U jE [U ] = ug
Finally, Axioms I, II and IIIimply the following results, which are analogous
to those already presented in the previous section.
Proposition 10. (lottery-dependent expected utility representa-
tion theorem for %u over U). Under Axioms I, II and III, the preorder
of preferences of a risk-averse decision maker labelled %ucan be represented
over U by the following lottery-dependent functional:
V (U) def=
Z 1
0
vE[U ](z)dGU (z) (16)
where vE[U ](:) is a continuous and increasing function mapping [0; 1] on to itself
which is dened up to an a¢ ne and positive transformation.
Proof. It is the same as the proofs given in Section 3 for Propositions 5 to
7.
The conditions of normalization will now read:
vE[U ](E [U ]) = E [U ] and E [U ] vE[U ](1)+(1  E [U ]) vE[U ](0) = c
 
UE[U ]

(17)
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and, here again, vE[U ](:) is unique and well dened.
One may now assume that risk premia are translation-invariant when they
are valued in utils, i.e. that the following property is met:
RP(U + u) = RP(U) (18)
where: RP(U) = E [U ]  R 1
0
vE[U ](z)dGU (z).
Using similar arguments as those already developed in Section 3, one can
show that the invariance by translation property implies that the functional
representing the decision makers preferences may now be rewritten as:
V(U) = E[U ] 
Z 1
0
D(z   E[U ])dGU (z) (19)
where D(:) is a disappointment function.
A subjective risk premium will then be dened as the following di¤erence:
RP (U) def= E [U ]  V(U) = E [U ]  c(U) (20)
A subjectively risk averse decision-maker will prefer U to V whenever V is a
mean preserving spread of U . A necessary and su¢ cient condition for subjective
risk aversion to occur is that any subjective risk premium is positive unless U
is degenerate, i.e.Z 1
0
D(z E[U ])dGU (z) = E [D(U   E[U ])] > 0 () U is not degenerate (21)
or, equivalently, that D(:) is strictly convex (i.e. D00(:) > 0 if D(:) is twice
continuously derivable).
The above results may be rewritten in terms of (monetary valued) random
outcomes. For instance, Equation (19) may be rewritten as:
U(X) = E[u (X)] 
Z b
a
D(u (x) E[u (X)])dFX(x) (22)
and a decision maker is rational if his preferences are represented by a func-
tional U(:) dened by (22) where D(:) is a disappointment function. All these
transpositions are straightforward. Equation (22) may be viewed as dening the
functional of LS-models.
Moreover, if D(:) is an innitely derivable disappointment function, the sub-
jective risk premium may be rewritten as:
RP (u (X)) =
P+1
p=2E [(u (X) E [u (X)])p]
D(p) (0)
p!
(23)
and the elementary premia are now the contributions of the variance, the skew-
ness, the kurtosis ... of the utility of a lottery to the total risk premium which
is demanded by a decision maker.
15
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.54RR (Version révisée)
Finally the preferences of a rational risk-averse decision maker can be rep-
resented by the following functional:
U(X) = E[u (X)] P+1p=2 ( 1)pApp (u (X)) (24)
where p (u (X))
def
= E [(u (X) E [u (X)])p]. In the case when RP (U) is re-
duced to its rst term, U (X) is equal to the expected utility minus a penalty
which is equal to the variance of the utility of the lottery, i.e.:
U (X) = E [u(X)] AVar [u(X)] (25)
Such a result is connected with a conjecture of Allais (1979) who argued that
a positive theory of choice should contain two basics elements: (i) the existence
of a cardinal utility function which is independent of risk attitudes and (ii) a
valuation functional of risky lotteries which depends on the second moment of
the probability distribution of uncertain utility. If constant marginal utility is
assumed, the above approach comes down to mean-variance analysis. Mean-
variance analysis can thus be viewed as a particular case of the LS-theory.14
However EU theory, and, consequently mean-variance analysis, is often vio-
lated by experiments and no general agreement has yet been found about the
explaining power of its challengers, i.e. Non-EU theories. Hence it is interesting
to point out that, because of its exibility, the functional (22) is compatible
with many of the anomalies of nancial theory.15 However, this issue is beyond
the scope of this article.
The above results (See Propositions 9 and 10) have been obtained from a
set of axioms dealing with preferences over u-lotteries. Note that they can
also be obtained di¤erently, from a set of axioms dealing with preferences over
m-lotteries (See Appendix 2).
Finally a functional such as U(:) which is dened by (22) and which meets
the above requirements will be called, from now on, a LS-functional and will
characterize LS-models.
4.2 Overview of the related literature
We now give a presentation of some links existing between LS-models and
some other disappointment models. As a preliminary, we emphasize that LS-
models are close to models à la Loomes and Sugden (1986) whose functional
reads:
U(X) = E[u (X)] 
Z b
a
D(u (x)  u)dFX(x)
since one may set u = E [u (X)] in the above functional, to make U(:) become
lottery-dependent.
14EU theory obviously provides the same result, but at the expense of an additional as-
sumption about the distribution of asset returns or the investors utility function.
15See e.g. Chauveau Th. and N. Nalpas. 2005. Disappointment, Pessimism and the Equity
Premia, Cahier de Recherche, Toulouse Business School Working Paper, septembre.
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Disappointment or elation may also be measured somewhat di¤erently: Del-
quie and Cillo (2006) use all the outcomes of the lottery; Grant and Kajii (1998)
adapt the setting of the rank-dependent expected utility model (Quiggin (1982)
among others) to highlight the dependence on the best possible outcome; Jia et
alii (2001) generalize Bells (1985) approach and advocate the use of its expected
value. Indeed, they consider the expected value of the lottery as the reference
point for measuring disappointment. Their preference functional can be dened
as:
UJDB (X) =
Z b
a
 
1 + d1[x<E(X)]   e1[x>E(X)]

xdFX(x) (26)
where d and e are two positive parameters. The above functional is nothing but
a particular case of (10).16
LS-models can also be viewed as particular case of lottery dependent utility
(henceforth LDU) models which were rst developed by Becker and Sarin (1987).
The preference functional of a LDU model is then:17
ULDU (X) =
PK
k=1 pkv (h(X); xk) (27)
where v [:; :] is a function dened over [a; b]R+ and whose values belong to
[0; 1] and where h(:) is a function dened over X and whose values belong to R.
The functional (27) can be derived from three axioms which have been provided
by Becker and Sarin (1987): total ordering, continuity and monotonicity. Their
rst two axioms are those of EU theory and the third one is nothing but the
SSD dominance principle. However, as pointed out by Starmer (2000) "the basic
model is conventional theory for minimalists as, without further restriction, it
has virtually no empirical content."18 Finally, almost any non-EU model can be
viewed as a LDU model, once an appropriate functional form of v(:) has been
chosen.
Becker and Sarin then particularize their model assessing h (X) to be linear
with respect to the probabilities pk, i.e. they set h(X) =
PK
k=1 hkpk and they
dene a function H(:) such that H (xk) = hk. To sum up, the authors set:
h(X) =
PK
k=1H (xk) pk = E [H [X]] (28)
and the new model then belongs to a subset of LDU models called lottery-
dependent expected utility models (henceforth LDEU models). The functions
h(:), or H(:), may be chosen arbitrarily but they have to be specied before
testable implications of the model be derived. As a consequence, LDEU models
are not choice-based.
Schmidt (2001) considers somewhat more general models called lottery-
dependent convex utility models(henceforth LDCU models). A condition less
restrictive than (28) is fullled by LDCU models. It reads:
h(Xi) =  and i  0 and
PN
i=1 i = 1) h
PN
i=1 iXi

=  (29)
16To see this point, just set: u (x) = x and uE[X](x) =
 
1 + d1[x<E[X]]   e1[x>E[X]]

x
17To make short only simple lotteries are taken into account.
18Starmer: Developments in Non Expected Utility Theory, JEL, p. 345.
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Four axioms are necessary to develop this class of models. The rst two
axioms (total ordering and continuity) are, again, those of EU theory. The au-
thor then substitutes for the independence axiom two new axioms: the rst one,
called the lottery dependent independence axiom, states that the independence
property is met over any subset X of lotteries fullling (29). However, to derive
LDCU models, U (X) has to be linear in every subset X for all . A linear U(:)
is obtained i¤ there exists a sequence of functions f';  2 [U( (0));U( (1))]g
where ' : R!R+ is continuous and increasing so that:
8 2 [U( (0));U( (1))] , U (X) = ' [u (X)] if X 2 X
This result is guaranteed by an additional axiom which is called the linearity
axiom and which enables him to select one particular function U(:) from all the
candidates. In contrast to LS-models, Schmidts approach is not fully choice-
based since using the axioms implies that the function h(:) be known on a priori
grounds.19
Finally, it must be underlined that Gul (1991) developed an implicit expected
utility model of disappointment where the certainty equivalent of the lottery
plays the role of reference level. It is fully axiomatized and some attempts have
been made to use this kind of preferences in an asset pricing model (See e.g.
Ang et alii 2005 and Routledge and Zin 2004). However, Guls theory does not
guarantee that the utility function which is derived from their axiomatic is the
most likely to be that of the decision maker. Moreover it is not endowed with
the invariance by translation property. In contrast, it is well endowed with an
elicitation property which is due to an extension (see Abdellaoui M. and H.
Bleichrodt 2007) of the trade-o¤ method (Wakker and Dene¤e 1996).
LS-models are also endowed with the elicitation property. Indeed, the likely
utility function can be elicited thanks to a method which is also parameter-free
and requires no assumption about utility nor disappointment aversion. To spare
space, this point is developed in Appendix 3.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, it has been shown that some important information about the
preferences of a decision maker can be gleaned from comparing his preferences
over lotteries and the preorders induced by stochastic dominances over random
utilities. This information is neglected in other theories of decision making
under risk. Consequently they cannot guarantee that the utility function which
is derived from their axiomatic is the most likely to be that of the decision
maker.
It has been shown that there exists one utility function which is best in
accordance with the decision makers preferences in that it induces a SSSD
relation over lotteries which is the closest to the original preorder of preferences.
19This is probably because the utility function has not been dened independently of the
setting of the axioms.
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It has been called the likely utility function. It is consistent and, consequently
no violations of SSSD occur, what is a logical requirement. It is nothing but
the superior enveloppe of the consistent concave or convex utility functions.
An original theory of disappointment, where the likely utility function is
dened before the axiomatic is set, has been developed. It remains close to that
of Loomes and Sugden (1986), although preferences are now lottery-dependent.
Its axiomatic includes the two rst axioms of EU theory and a linearity axiom
for the certainty equivalents of lotteries which exhibit the same (likely) expected
utility. An expected utility representation of preferences has been derived from
this axiomatic. The assumption of the translation invariance of risk premia
then allows for a functional which is that of Loomes and Sugden except that
the reference level is now the decision makers wealth expected utility.
LS-models are endowed with many interesting properties which have been
presented above. Among them one must be emphasized: the consistency be-
tween the denitions of risk and risk aversion and, in particular, the compati-
bility of the assumed behaviour of the decision maker with the denition of a
coherent measure of risk.
Finally, the above theory of disappointment may be used to understand the
behaviour of risk-averse agents on the nancial markets. It is compatible with
the so-called "nancial anomalies" or the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and
Prescott 1985).20 What is more, under the assumption of constant relative risk
aversion(s), one can easily implement the above approach to value any nancial
asset. An example of this valuation for CDSs is being developed.21
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6 Appendix 1. The case of piecewise concave/
convex likely utility functions
In this subsection, we shall allow for utility functions which are not concave/convex
over the whole interval [a;b]. We set the following denition:
Denition 6 (w0-utility function). Let ua(:) (ub(:)) be a C1 utility function dened
over [a;w0] ([w0;b]) and let u(:) : [a; b] ! [0; 1] be dened by :
u(x) = (w0)ua(x) for x2[a;w0] and
u(x) = (w0)+(1  (w0))ub(x) for x2[w0;b]
where (w0) = u
;
b(w0)=(u
;
a(w0) + u
;
b(w0)) 2 [0; 1]. Then function u(:) will be called
the w0-utility function canonically associated with ua(:) and ub(:). Conversely, if u(:)
is a w0-utility function over [a;b], then there exists a unique C1 utility function dened
over [a;w0] and a unique C1 utility function dened over [w0;b] such that u(:) is
canonically associated with ua(:) and ub(:). The latter functions are given by :
ua(x)=u(x)=u(w0) for x2[a;w0] and
ub(x)=u(w0)+(u(x)  u(w0))=(1  u(w0)) for x2[w0;b]
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If ua(:) and ub(:) are both concave (both convex), then u(:) is concave (convex).
If ua(:) is concave (convex) and ub(:) convex (concave) then function u(:) is piecewise
concave or convex. When a w0-utility function is piecewise concave or convex, then
it has an inection point at (w0; u(w0)). A geometrical illustration of the above
denitions is given on Figures 2A and 2B.
The following proposition may now be substituted for Proposition 3.
Proposition 11. (likely w0-utility function). Let w0 be an arbitrary level of wealth
belonging to ]a;b[. There exists a unique consistent C1 w0-utility function u(:)mapping
[a;b] on to [0;1] which is such that the preorder <u2 is the closest to the preorder of pref-
erences % among the preorders induced by consistent w0-utility functions over [a;b]. It
is the w0-utility function canonically associated with the likely utility functions ua(:)
and ub(:) which are dened over [a;w0] and [w0;b]. It is piecewise concave/convex. It
will be called, from now on, the likely w0-utility function of the decision maker.
Proof. It is similar to the proof of Proposition 3.
In the above discussion, we have focused on w0-utility functions because the in-
vestors behaviour may di¤er, as suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), when
he faces gains or losses, i.e. when his ex-post wealth X is higher or lower than his
initial (certain) wealth w0. Gains (losses) occur when X(!) is higher (lower) than
w0. However, the above analysis could clearly be extended to functions whose graph
includes N successive concave and convex sections. However, such an extension is
beyond the scope of this article.
7 Appendix 2. An alternative axiomatic
Consequences will now be valued in monetary units. As in Section 3, Axioms 1 and
2 will be set: they are clearly equivalent to Axioms I and II. In contrast, Axiom 3 is
not equivalent to Axiom IIIand, consequently, a new axiom will now be set:
Axiom 3. The utility of the certainty equivalent of the (;1  )-mixing of two m-
lotteries which exhibit the same expected utility is the corresponding convex combination
of the utilities of their certainty equivalents, what formally reads :
8X1; X22 Xu; 8 2 [0; 1]; u(c(X1(1  )X2))= u(c(X1))+(1  )u(c(X2))
where Xu = fX 2 X j u(x) =u)
Axiom 3is clearly equivalent to Axiom IIIand, consequently, setting Axioms 1,
2 and 3is equivalent to setting Axioms I, II and III. As a consequence, we get the
following result:
Proposition 12. (lottery-dependent expected utility representation theorem for %
over X).s Under Axioms 1,2, and 3, the preorder of preferences % of a risk averse
decision maker can be represented over X by the following lottery-dependent func-
tional:
U(X)def= R b
a
uE[u(X)](x)dFX(x) (30)
where uE[u(X)](:) is a continuous and increasing function mapping [a;b] on to [0;1]
and which meets the normalization conditions (17).
Proof. Proposition 12 is clearly equivalent to Proposition 10.
22
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.54RR (Version révisée)
8 Appendix 3. The elicitation property22
As shown in the following subsection, the likely utility function can be elicited
thanks to an elicitation method which is parameter-free and requires no assumption
about utility nor disappointment aversion.
8.1 Preliminary denitions and results
Recall that, unlike EU models, LS-models are not endowed with a global indepen-
dence property. In particular, some couples of indi¤erent lotteries ((X1; X2) 2X X
with X1 X2) are such that X1(1  )X2 X1 for some values of 2[0;1]. How-
ever, there also exist, in these models, some couples of indi¤erent lotteries which do
exhibit the betweenness property: they will be called, from now on, strongly indi¤erent
lotteries.
Denition 7. (strong indi¤erence). Two lotteries X1 and X2 are strongly indif-
ferent i¤ they meet the following requirement:
8 2 [0; 1]; X1(1  )X2 X1 (31)
Strong indi¤erence can be characterized in the following way:
Proposition 13. In LS-models, two lotteries X1 and X2 are strongly indi¤erent i¤
they exhibit the same certainty equivalent and the same expected utility, what formally
reads :
X1 X2() c(X1) = c(X2) and E[u(X1)] = E[u(X2)]
Proof. It is given in Appendix 3.
The binary relation "X1 andX2 are strongly indi¤erent" will be labelled "X1 X2".
It is obviously reexive and symmetric. From Proposition 13 we get that it is also tran-
sitive and, consequently, it is an equivalence relation over X. Finally, note that strong
indi¤erence implies indi¤erence in the usual sense which will be called, from now on,
weak indi¤erence. A related new concept needs now to be introduced: that of strong
equivalents.
Denition 8. (strong equivalents). Let X1 be an arbitrary lottery and let :
Xxp
def
= [a; x; 1  p; p] ; Xyqdef= [y; b; q; 1  q]
where x;y2]a;b[. Then if X and Xxp (X
y
q) are strongly indi¤erent, then X
x
p (X
y
q) is
the left (right) strong equivalent of X .
The above denition will make sense only if any lottery is endowed with a unique
couple of strong equivalents. As indicated in the next proposition, this happens to be
the case.
Proposition 14. In LS-models, a lottery has exactly one left and one right strong
equivalent.
Proof. It is given in Appendix 3.
22This subsection is but a rewriting of: Chauveau Th., N. Nalpas [2010]. Disappointment
models: an axiomatic approach, CES workingpaper, 2010.102
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8.2 The elicitation property
We now turn to the elicitation property. The rst step of the argument is as follows:
let X
y
q be the right strong equivalent of X
x
p i.e. let:
X
y
q  Xxp
Then, the di¤erence between the expected utility of Xxp and that of X
y
q is 1  q.23
Indeed, we get that:
E[u(Xxp)] E[u(Xyq)] = E[u(X
y
q)] E[u(Xyq)] = ((1  q) + qu(y))  qu(y) = 1  q
The second step consists in dening a sequence of binary lotteries, fXxnpngn2N as
indicated below:
x0= w ; p0 =  and X
xn+1
pn+1  Xxnpn (32)
Note that, if X
y
q is the right strong equivalent of X
x
p , then y < x. As a conse-
quence, fxngn2N is a decreasing sequence. Moreover, it is such that the di¤erence
between the expected utilities of two consecutive binary lotteries, Xxnpn and X
xn+1
pn+1 ,
is equal to the second weight (1  pn+1) of the right strong equivalent of Xxnpn , what
formally reads:
E[u(Xxnpn )] E[u(Xxn+1pn+1 )] = 1  pn+1
As a consequence, we get that:
u(w) E[u(Xxnpn )] = E[u(Xx0p0 )] E[u(Xxnpn )] =
Pn
i=1 (1  pi)
and the expected utility of the initial lottery is the sum of the expected utility of any
element of the sequence and of the accumulation of the second weights of the right
strong equivalents, what formally reads:
u(w) = E[u(Xx0p0 )] = E[u(X
xn
pn )]+
Pn
i=1 (1  pi)
Alternatively, one could consider the following sequence of binary lotteries:
y0= w ; q0=  ; X
yn+1
qn+1
 Xyn1 qn (33)
The elements of the sequence fXyn1 qngn2N are endowed with the following prop-
erty:
E[u(Xyn+1qn+1 )] E[u(Xynqn )] = 1  qn+1=) u(w) = E[u(X
yn
qn )] 
Pn
i=1 (1  qi)
From now on, the sequences fXxnpngn2N and fX
yn
1 qngn2N, will be called the
canonical sequences generated by (w;). The rst (second) one is the left (right)
canonical sequence. As shown below, they respectively converge, in LS-models, to-
wards (0) or (1).
23Recall that Xyq
def
= [a; y; 1  q; q]
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Proposition 15. Let (w;)2]a; b[]0;1[. Consider the canonical sequences of binary
lotteries generated by (w;). Then, in LS-models where decision makers are disap-
pointment averse, the left (right) canonical sequence is decreasing24 (increasing25 ) and
converges towards (a)26 ((b)27 ). Moreover, we get the following equalities :
u(w) = (
P1
i=1 (1  pi))= = (1 
P1
i=0 (1  qi))= (34)
Proof. It is given in Appendix 3.
Finally, in LS-models, the set of lotteries X is well endowed with the elicitation
property, i.e. the value of u(w) can be elicited with as much accuracy as desired for
any outcome w2]a; b[. Indeed, one can choose an arbitrary probability 2]0;1[ and
build, from the answers of a decision maker facing lotteries of the Xxp type and/or of
the X
y
q type, the two canonical sequences generated by (w;). An accurate ranging
of u(w) should be obtained since we have the inequalities:
0 <
Pn
i=1 (1  pi))=  u(w)  (1 
Pn
i=1 (1  qi))= (35)
Once u(w) has been elicited, the aversion coe¢ cients of (24) can be elicited in a
standard way.
9 Appendix 4. Proofs
9.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Let Yi=u(Xi) for i=1;2. By denition of SSSD, it is equivalent to state:
(a) X1 <u2 X2, or:
(b) U1 <2 U2, or, equivalently,
(c)
R v
0
[FU1(t) FU2(t)]dt  0 for v 2 [0;1].
Now, since we have:R v
0
[FU1(t) FU2(t)]dt =
R u 1(v)
a
[FX1(x) FX2(x)]u
;
(x)dx. (I)
condition (c) is equivalent to the following one:R z
a
[FX1(x) FX2(x)]u
;
(x)dx  0 for any z2[a; b].

9.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
As a preliminary, recall that u(:) is more concave than v(:) i¤ u  v 1(:) is concave
i.e. if there exists a concave function g(:) mapping [v(a); v(b)] on to [u(a);u(b)] and
such that: u(x) =g  v(x) for x 2 [a; b]:
24That isXxmpm is preferred to X
xn
pn if n  m
25That is X
yn
qn is preferred to X
yn;b
qn if n  m
26Equivalently, one can say that fxngn2N is a decreasing sequence of real numbers converg-
ing towards a and that fpngn2N is a sequence of real numbers converging towards 1.
27Equivalently, one can say that fyngn2N is an increasing sequence of real numbers con-
verging towards b and that fqngn2N is a sequence of real numbers converging towards 1.
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Since, by assumption, u(:) and v(:) are increasing and C1, g(:) is also increasing
and C1 and we get that g;(:) > 0. The rest of the proof is grounded on the following
calculations: let
(z)
def
=
Z z
a
u;(x)(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dx
(z)
def
=
Z z
a
v;(x)(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dx
G(z)
def
= g;(v(z))
Then, (z) may be rewritten as:
(z)=
Z z
a
g;(v(x))v;(x)(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dx =
Z z
a
G(x)d(x)
Integrating by parts yields:
(z) = G(z)(z) 
Z z
a
(x)dG(x) (36)
Recall that G(x) > 0, that G(:) is decreasing and that v;(x) > 0. Hence if
(z)
def
=
R z
a
v;(t)(FX1(t)  FX2(t))dt has a constant sign for any z2[a; b], (z) is
endowed with that sign. In particular, we get the following result, which holds for any
z2[a; b]:Z z
a
v;(t)(FX1(t)  FX2(t))dt < 0 )
Z z
a
u;(x)(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dx = (z) < 0
or:
X1 <v2 X2) X1 <u2 X2 , Xv2  Xu2
and, as a consequence:
Xv 2  Xu 2 and Xv+2  Xu+2

9.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
Let U denote the subset of utility functions which are, by assumption, increasing,
derivable and concave or convex (henceforth c/c). Let the subset of concave (convex)
utility functions be labelled Ua (Ux). We have:
U = Ua[Ux and Ua\Ux= ff(:)g
where f(:) is the a¢ ne function dened by f (x) = (x a)=(b a). Note that the graph
of any concave (convex) utility function is above (below) that of f(:).
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Let UI (Uc) be the subset of inconsistent (consistent) c/c utility functions and
UaC (U
a
I , U
x
C, U
x
I ) be the subset of concave consistent (concave inconsistent, convex
consistent, convex inconsistent) utility functions. Two cases may occur, according to
the fact that the (standard) SSD dominance property is violated or not.
A. We rst assume that the (standard) SSD dominance property is not vio-
lated. As a consequence, there exists at least one concave function which is consistent.
It is the a¢ ne function f(:). Hence: UaC 6= ? ; UC= UaC[UxC . Moreover, we have:
UxI= ? and UI= U
a
I . Indeed, if U
x
I were not empty there would exist some inconsis-
tent convex functions whose graph would be below that of f(:).
A trivial subcase is when UaC=ff(:)g. Proposition 3 is then clearly valid.
We now leave aside this trivial case and we assume that UaC includes at least one
strictly concave utility function. The superior enveloppe of the consistent c/c utility
functions is then dened by:
u(:) = sup
u2UC
(u) = sup
u2UaC
(u)
Let epi(u) be the epigraph of u. Then all the functions belonging to UaC are
concave and, from standard convex analysis, we get that:
epi(u) = \u2Ucepi(u)
and, consequently, that u(:) is concave. The epigraph of any consistent utility function
then includes epi(u) i.e.:
u 2 Uc ) epi(u)  epi(u)
Finally, note that u(:) is obviously increasing and normalized.
Now we want to prove that u(:) is also consistent and derivable. To see this,
consider a pair of consistent utility functions u; v 2 Uac. Let C(u; v) be the convex
enveloppe of u and v. and let  (u) be the graph of u(:). Three cases may occur:
either
(a) C(u; v)= u(:), or
(b) C(u; v)= v(:), or
(c)  (C(u; v)) consists in three elements: a part of  (u), a part of  (v) and the
segment PuPv where Pu (Pv) is the tangency point between (a) the common tangent
to  (u) and  (v) and (b)  (u) ( (v)). C(u; v) is clearly derivable, increasing and
normalized.
We now claim that it is consistent (i.e. that C(u; v)2 Uac or, equivalently, that
epi(u)  epi(C(u; v)) or, alternatively, that hypo(C(u; v))  hypo(u)) or, nally,
u(x)  C(u; v)(x) for all x 2 [a; b] (37)
This statement is clearly valid in cases (a) and (b). In the third case, let P u
(P v ) be the point of  (u) whose abscissa is that of Pu (Pv). Then segment PuPv
must lie below segment P uP

v , because, otherwise, u(:) could not be the superior
enveloppe of the consistent utility functions. As a consequence, the convex enveloppe
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of two consistent utility functions is a consistent utility function i.e. it is an increasing,
normalized, concave and derivable function meeting the following requirement:
epi(u) \ epi(v) epi(C(u; v))) (38)
Note that C(u; v) is also the convex enveloppe of Max(u; v), i.e. we get that:
C(u; v) = C(Max(u; v))
The convex enveloppe of the utility functions, v must then coincide with their
superior enveloppe u. Indeed, for any x 2 [a; b], for any utility function u; we get
that C(u; f)(x) = u(x) and, as a consequence, that:
u(x)
def
= sup
u
u(x) =sup C(u; f)(x)
u
sup C(u; v)(x)def=
u;v
v(x) (39)
and from (37) and (39) we get that:
v = u
Moreover, since all the Cs are derivable so is v. Indeed let x; y; z 2 [a; b] with
z < x < y. We have:
u(y)  u(x)= u(y)  C(u; v; w)(y) + C(u; v; w)(y)  C(u; v; w)(x)+C(u; v; w)(x)  u(x)
u(x)  u(z)= u(x)  C(u; v; w)(x) + C(u; v; w)(x)  C(u; v; w)(z)+C(u; v; w)(z)  u(z)
where C(u; v; w) is the convex enveloppe of the consistent utility functions u(:); v(:);
and w(:), and, consequently:
ju(y) u(x)y x   C(u;v;w)(y) C(u;v;w)(x)y x j  ju(y) C(u;v;w)(y)y x j+ jC(u;v;w)(x) u(x)y x j
ju(x) u(z)x z   C(u;v;w)(x) C(u;v;w)(z)x z j  ju(x) C(u;v;w)(x)x z j+ jC(u;v;w)(z) u(z)x z j
Since u(:) is the superior enveloppe of the utility functions, one can choose u(:); v(:); w(:)
such that, for any " > 0
ju(x)  u(x)j  "(y   x)=8, what implies that ju(x)  C(u; v; w)(x)j  "(y   x)=8
ju(y)  v(y)j  "(y   x)=8, what implies that ju(y)  C(u; v; w)(y)j  "(y   x)=8
ju(z)  w(z)j  "(y   x)=8, what implies that ju(z)  C(u; v; w)(z)j  "(y   x)=8
As a consequence one can choose u(:); v(:); w(:) such that, for any " > 0
ju(y) u(x)y x   C(u;v;w)(y) C(u;v;w)(x)y x j  "=8
ju(x) u(z)x z   C(u;v;w)(x) C(u;v;w)(z)x z j  "=8
Since C(u; v; w) is derivable we also get that, for any " > 0
jC(u;v;w)(y) C(u;v;w)(x)y x   dC(u;v;w)(x)dx j  "=8
jC(u;v;w)(y) C(u;v;w)(x)y x   dC(u;v;w)(x)dx j  "=8
and, consequently:
ju(y) u(x)y x   dC(u;v;w)dx (x)j "=4 and ju(x) u(z)x z   dC(u;v;w)dx (x)j "=4
Since u(:) is convex, we get that
lim <
y#x
u(y) u(x)
y x = u
;
r(x) and lim
z"x
u(x) u(z)
x z = u
;
l(x)
and, as a consequence, for any " > 0:
ju(y) u(x)y x   u;r(x)j "=4 and ju(x) u(z)x z   u;l(x)j "=4
Combining the above inequalities, we get that, for any " > 0
ju;r(x)  dC(u;v;w)dx (x)j "=2 and ju;l(x)  dC(u;v;w)dx (x)j "=2
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and, consequently:
ju;r(x)  u;l(x)j "
Finally, u(:) is well derivable and its derivative is u;(x) = u;r(x) = u
;
l(x) =lim"!0
dC(u;v;w)
dx (x).
The last property to prove is that u(:) is consistent. This is well the case since we
have:
(z)
def
=
R z
a
u;(x)(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dx
=
R z
a
u;(x)(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dx+
R z
a
(u;(x)  u;(x))(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dx
and that the second integral may be made negligible since we have:
jR z
a
(u;(x)  u;(x))(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dxj sup (ju;(x)  u;(x)j) = sup (ju;(x)  dC(u;v;w)dx (x)j)
As a consequence, the condition
R z
a
u;(x)(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dx < 0 is equivalent
to the condition
R z
a
u;(x)(FX1(x)  FX2(x))dx < 0.
B. We now assume that the (standard) SSD dominance property is violated.
No concave utility functions can be consistent, i.e. Uac=?.28 Finally, we get that
Uxc= Uc and that the superior enveloppe of the consistent c/c utility functions reads:
u(:) = sup
u2UC
(u) = sup
u2UxC
(u)
Then, from standard convex analysis, we get that:
epi(u) = \u2Ucepi(u)
and that u(:) is convex. It is also increasing and normalized. The rest of the proof is
similar to the above discussion.
9.4 Proof of Proposition 6.
We are looking for a utility function ux(:) over [a; b], satisfying the expected utility
representation, i.e. meeting the following requirement:29
E[ux(x)] = Ux (X) (40)
We shall successively, consider the case when X is:
(I) an arbitrary binary lottery Z belonging to any of two special subsets of Xx.
whose exact denition is given below.
(II) an arbitrary binary lottery Z belonging to Xx (i.e. Z = [y; x; 1  ; ] with
x+ (1 )y=x)
(III) an arbitrary simple lottery Z belonging to Xx
(IV) an arbitrary lottery belonging to Xx. (i.e. Z 2 Xx)
I. The rst step consists in considering two particular subsets of binary
lotteries which belong to Xx and include either the outcome a or the outcome b
among their outcomes.
28 In contrast, the subset of convex utility functions is never empty since it always
includes the following function: u(x) =0 for x2[a; b[ and u(b) = 1.
29Recall that the degenerate lottery z does not belong to Xx unless z = x. Hence we must
make up for this drawback and dene a utility function from its expected utility representation
over non degenerate lotteries..
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Group A. The elements of this group are dened as indicated below:
Xxp
def
= [a; x; 1  p; p]
where x 2 [x; b]. Since by assumption Xxp2 Xx we get that:
px+ a(1  p) = x (41)
or, equivalently, that:
p =
x  a
x  a (42)
Group B. The elements of this group are dened as indicated below:
X
y
q
def
= [y; b; q; 1  q]
where y2 [a;x]. Since, by assumption Xyq2 Xx we get that:
qy+b (1  q) = x (43)
or, equivalently, that:
q =
b  x
b y (44)
Now recall that, by denition,
Xx
def
= [a; b; 1  (x) ; (x) ]
where x 2 [x; 1] and
 (x)
def
=
x  a
b  a
Moreover, let  2 [0; 1] be dened by the following equivalence:
Xx  Xxp
where:
Xx
def
= x(1  )Xx
Finally, we are looking for a utility function ux(:) satisfying the following expected
utility representation (40):
pux(x)+ (1  p)ux(a) = x+ (1  )c(Xx) (45)
where c(Xx) is the certainty equivalent of Xx. Let:
ux(x) =
x  a
x  a [x+ (1  ) c(Xx)] 
x  x
x  aux(a) (46)
Then, for x =x, we get that p = 1,  = 1, and that:
ux(x) = x (47)
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Similarly, for x = b, we get that p = (x),  = 0, and that:
ux(b) =
b  a
x  ac(Xx) 
b  x
x  aux(a) (48)
B. We now consider the second group of binary lotteries. From (43) we
get that:
qy+b (1  q) = x
or, equivalently, that:
q =
b  x
b y () 1  q =
x y
b y
Next, let  2 [0; 1] be now dened by:
X

x  X
y
q
We are now looking for a utility function meeting the following requirement:
E[ux(X)] = Ux(Xx) (49)
or:
qux(y)+ (1  q)ux (b) = x+ (1  )c(Xx) (50)
or, equivalently:
b  x
b y ux(y)+
x y
b y ux (b) = x+ (1  )c(Xx)
or, nally:
ux(y) =
b y
b  x [x+ (1  )c(Xx)] 
x y
b  xux(b) (51)
Hence for y = x, we get that q = 1,  = 1, and, again, equation (47). For y=a,
we get that q = 1  (x),  = 0, and:
ux(a) =
b  a
b  xc(Xx) 
x  a
b  xux (b) (52)
Clearly equations (48) and (52) are the same and can be rewritten as:
E[ux(Xx)] =
x  a
b  a ux (b) +
b  x
b  aux(a) = c(Xx) (53)
The normalization conditions of the utility function come down to (47) and (53).
Finally, note that we have the following relations:
Ux
 
Xxp

= E[ux(X
x
p)] =
x  a
x  aux (x) +
x  x
x  aux(a)
Ux

X
y
q

= E[ux(X
y
q)] =
x y
b y ux (b) +
b  x
b y ux (x)
Ux (Xx)= E[ux(Xx)] = c(Xx)
Ux (x)= E[ux(x)] = ux(x) = x
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ux (b) =
b  a
x  ac(Xx) 
b  x
x  aux(a)
II:We now show that the above result holds for all binary lotteries belonging
to Xx. Indeed, let Z = [y; x; 1  ; ] and assume that Z 2 Xx. As a consequence,
we get that:
x+ (1 ) y= x (54)
Consider the two following compound lotteries:
Xxp  (1  )X
y
q
and
Z  (1  )Xx
where ; ;2 [0; 1]. The two lotteries have the same support f0; x; y; 1g and will
coincide30 i¤ they exhibit the same probabilities, i.e. i¤ :
(1  p)= (1  )(1  (x))
(1  )q= (1  ) (55)
p=
(1  )(1  q)=(x)(1  )
Actually there are only two independent equations among the four above because
(a) the probabilities sum to one we may therefore leave aside the last equation
and since
(b) p and q both depend on x.31 Indeed, combining the three remaining equations
gives an equation which is nothing but (54).
From the linearity of Ux(:) we also get that:
Ux(Xxp  (1  )X
y
q)= Ux(Xxp) + (1  )Ux(X
y
q)
Ux (Z  (1  )Xx)= Ux (Z) +(1  )Ux (Xx)
and, consequently:
Ux (Z)=  1
h
Ux(Xxp) + (1  )Ux(X
y
q)  (1  )Ux (Xx)
i
=


Ux(Xxp)+
(1  )

Ux(Xyq) 
(1  )

Ux (Xx)
and, substituting  and  for their values in (55) we get that:
Ux(Z) =
p
Ux(Xxp)+
1 
q
Ux(Xyq) 
(1  q)(1  )
q(x)
Ux (Xx)
30 i.e. Xdp  (1  )X
c
q = Z  (1  )Xx
31They are linked together by the following formula: q = d (1  p) =(d  c)
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or equivalently:
Ux (Z)=ux (x) + (1 )ux(y)+x  x
x  aux(a)
+ (1 ) x y
b  xux(b) 
(1  q) (1 )
q (x)
ux (c(Xx))
and, nally:
Ux(Z)= E [ux (Z)] +x y
x y
x  x
b  x ux(a)+
x  x
b  x
x y
b  xux(b)
  x y
b  x
x  x
x y
b  a
x  a [(x)ux(b) + (1  (x))ux(a)]
= E [ux (Z)] +
x  y
x  y
x  x
b  x ux(a)+
x  x
b  x
x y
b  xux(b)
 

x y
b  x
x  x
x y ux (b) +
x y
x y
x  x
x  aux(a)

= E [ux (Z)]
III: Next, from a straightforward induction method, we can derive, for any
simple lottery whose expected value is x:
E [ux(Z)] =
P
pZ(x)ux(x)) = Ux(Z)
Thus, the utility of a simple lottery equals the expected utility of its consequences.
However, the induction argument is valid only if the number of possible consequences
is nite. Hence, It remains to be shown that Axiom 3 implies expected utility maxi-
mization over the whole subset Xx.
IV: To obtain the expected utility representation over the entire subset,32 one
can proceed as indicated below. Any lottery X 2 Xx whose c.d.f. FX(:) is continuous
can be viewed as the limit of two sequences of simple lotteries whose expected value
is x and which either SSSD dominate X or are SSSD dominated by X . To see this,
recall that we have:
x % X % Xx
and consider the two sequences of simple lotteries fXngn2N and fXn gn2N where
Xn and X

n both belong to Xx and which are dened as indicated on Figure 3.
Step 1.
Lotteries X1 and X

1 are such that:
FX1 (x) = FX
 
x21

if x 2 [x11; x31[ ; FX1 (x) = 1 if x = x31
FX1 (x) = 0 if x 2 [x11; x21[ ; FX1 (x) = 1 if x 2 [x
2
1; x
3
1[, where:
x11=a ; x
2
1= E[X] =x ; x
3
1= b and:
32Note that we do not need any additional axiom (dominance and/or monotonicity) since
these further axioms are are implied by the property of strict risk aversion.
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E[X] =
R b
a
xdFX(x)() FX (E[X]) = b E[X]b a
Step 2.
Lotteries X2 and X

2 are dened as indicated below:
FX2 (x) = FX(x
2
2) if x 2 [x12; x32[ ; FX2 (x) = FX(x42) if x 2 [x32; x52[ ; FX2 (x) = 1
if x = x52
FX2 (x) = 0 if x 2 [x12; x22[ ; FX2 (x) = FX(x
3
2) if x 2 [x22; x42[ ; FX2 (x) = 1 if
x 2 [x42; x52]
where:
x12
def
= x11=a ; x
3
2
def
= x21= E[X] =x ; x
5
2
def
= x31= b
and where x22 and x
4
2 are dened by the following conditions:R x21
x11
xdFX(x) = x
2
2FX(x
3
2) = x
2
2(FX(x
2
1)  FX(x11))R x31
x21
xdFX(x) = x
4
2(1  FX(x21)) = x
4
2FX(x
3
1)  FX(x21))
....
Step n. Finally, fXngn2N and fXn gn2N are dened recursively by the following
equations:
x2i 1n+1 = x
i
n if i = 1; 2
n+1 (56)
x2in+1= (
R xi+1n
xin
xdFX(x))=(FX(x
i+1
n )  FX(xin)) if i = 1; 2n (57)
FXn+1(x)= FX(x
2i
n+1) if x 2 [x2i 1n+1 ; x2i+1n+1 [ and i = 1; 2n (58)
FXn+1(x)= FX(x
2i+1
n+1 ) if x 2 [x2in+1; x2i+2n+1 [ and i = 1; 2n (59)
given that we have:
FXn+1(x
2n+1
n+1 ) = FXn+1
(x
2n+1
n+1 ) = 1 and:
FXn+1(x) = FX(x
1
n) =0 if x 2 [x1n+1; x2n+1[.
Whatever the value of x, the two sequences of simple lotteries which we have
built converge towards X . To see this, rst recall that the sequence whose general
term is j FXn (x)  FXn(x) j converges towards a limit `x 0 since it is a decreasing
sequence of positive real numbers. Hence, for any " > 0, there exists n 2 N such that:
n  N ) `x j FXn(x)  FXn (x) j `x+" (60)
Actually `x must be zero otherwise a contradiction would appear. To see this, as-
sume that `x> 0 and consider the subdivision fxiNgi=1;2N 1+1. Assume provisionally
that x 2 [x2kN ; xk+1N 1[. From (58) and (59) we get that:
FXN (x) = FX(x
2k
N ) and FXN (x) = FX(x
2k+1
N ) = FX(x
k+1
N 1)
From (60) we get that:
FXN (x)  FXN (x) = FX(x
2k
N
)  FX(x2k+1N )  `x (61)
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Consider the next subdivision fxiN+1gi=1;(2)N+1+1 and assume, again provision-
ally, that x 2 [x2kN ; x4kN+1[. From (58) and (59) we get that:
FXN+1(x) = FX(x
4k
N+1) and FXN+1(x) = FX(x
4k+1
N+1 ) = FX(x
2k
N )
From (60) we get that:
FXN+1(x)  FXN+1(x) = FX(x
4k+1
N+1
)  FX(x2kN )  `x
Let y 2 [x4kN+1; x2k+1N [. From (58) and (59) we get that:
FXN+1(y) = FX(x
4k
N+1) and FXN+1 (y) = FX(x
4k+1
N+1 ) = FX(x
2k+1
N
)
From (60) we get that:
FXN+1(y)  FXN+1(y) = FX(x
4k
N+1)  FX(x2k+1N )  `y
Now, since we have FX(x
2k
N )  FX(x4kN+1)  0 and FX(x4kN+1)  FX(x2k+1N ) 
0 and using (61) we get that:
j FX(x)  FXn(x) j =j FX(x
2k
N )  FX(x2k+1N ) j
= j FX(x2kN )  FX(x4kN+1) j + j FX(x4kN+1)  FX(x2k+1N ) j  `x+`y
As a consequence we cannot have
FX(x)  FXn(x)2[`x; `x+"] for any inni-
tesimal quantity " unless `y= 0. Such a conclusion clearly does not depend on the
initial choice of x and y. Finally, the two sequences both converge towards X i.e. :
lim
n!1X

n = lim
n!1X

n= X (62)
Since Ux(:) is continuous we also get that:
lim
n!1Ux (X

n ) = Ux (X) = lim
n!1Ux (X

n) (63)
Now recall that, by denition, the two sequences of simple lotteries which we have
built are such that:
(a) Xn (X

n ) is a mean preserving spread (henceforth MPS) of X

n 1 (X

n+1),
(b) Xn and X

n belong to Xx
(c) Xn is a MPS of X which, in its turn, is a MPS of X

n .
Hence, we get that:
x % X1 % ::: % Xn % X % Xn % ::: % X1 % Xx
or, equivalently:
Ux(x)  Ux(X1 )  :::  Ux(Xn )  Ux(X)  Ux(Xn)  :::  Ux(X1 )  Ux(Xx)
or, alternatively:
Ux(x)  E[ux(X1 )]  :::  E[ux(Xn )]  :::Ux(X):::  E[ux(Xn)]  :::  E[ux(X1 )]  Ux(Xx)
and, nally:
lim
n!1E[ux(X

n )] = Ux(X) = lim
n!1E[ux(X

n)] (64)
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Now we have to show that Ux (X) =E [ux (X)]. To do so, we just do as before,
given that the subdivisions are now dened as indicated below:
u2i 1n+1 = u
i
nR ui+1n
uin
udGU (u)= u
2i
n ((GU (u
i+1
n ) GU (uin)) for i = 1; 2n
where u =ux (x) uin=ux
 
xin

, GU (u) = GU (ux (x)) = FX (x)
and
R 1
0
udGU (u) =
R b
a
ux (x)dFX (x).
GUn+1 (u)= GU (u
2i
n+1) for u 2

u2i 1n+1 ; u
2i+1
n+1

and i = 1; 2n
GUn+1 (u)= GU (u
2i+1
n+1 ) for u 2

u2in+1; u
2i+2
n+1

and i = 1; 2n
Finally, the two sequences fE [ux (Xn)]gn2N and fE [ux (Xn )]gn2N have the
same limit Ux (X) which is but E [ux (X)].
9.5 Proof of Proposition 8.
Let g(z; z   x)def= uz(x)  z and zdef= E[X]: Invariance by translation then implies
that:
z+x R b
a
(g(z+x; z   x) + z + x)dFX(x) = z 
R b
a
(g(z; z   x) + z)dFX(x)
or: R b
a
g(z + x; z   x)dFX(x) =
R b
a
g(z; z   x)dFX(x)
Since the above equality is valid for any c.d.f. FX(:) and any values of x, z and
x, we get that:
g(z + x; z   x)  g(z; z   x) = 0
i.e. that g(z; z   x) depends only on z   x. Hence we set:
g(z; z   x) = E(x  z)
where E(:) is an arbitrary function. Finally we get: uz(z) = z + E(x  z). E(:)
is continuous and increasing because, from Proposition 6, uz(:) is continuous and
increasing. To see this, recall that u0(x) = E(x). 
9.6 Proof of Proposition 13.
The rst part of the proof consists in proving that, in LS-models, two lotteries X1
and X2 which have the same expected utility u and the same certainty equivalent c,
are strongly equivalent. Let X1 and X2 exhibit the same expected utility u and the
same certainty equivalent c. From (22) we get, for i= 1; 2:
u(c) =u+
PN
n=1 p
i
nE [(u(xn) u)]
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where Xi=

x1; :::; xN ; p
i
1; :::; p
i
N

(i = 1; 2) and where u=
PN
n=1 p
i
nu(xn). As a
consequence, we have:PN
n=1 p
1
nE [(u(xn) u)] 
PN
n=1 p
2
nE [(u(xn) u)] = 0 (65)
Now, consider the compound lottery
X
def
= X1(1  )X2=
h
x1; :::; xN ; p
1
1+(1  )p21; :::; p1N+(1  )p2N
i
Its expected utility is:
E [u(X)] =
PN
n=1

p1n+(1  )p2n

u (xn) =u
From (22) we also get that:
u(c(X)) =u+
PN
n=1

p1n+(1  )p2n

(E [u(xn) u])
where c(X) is the certainty equivalent of X and, nally:
u(c(X))  u (c) = (
PN
n=1 p
1
nE [(u(xn) u)] 
PN
n=1 p
2
nE [(u(xn) u)]) = 0
The proof of the converse is as follows. We must show that if X1 and X2 are
strongly equivalent i.e. if they have the same certainty equivalent and if they exhibit
the betweenness property, then they exhibit the same expected utility. To do so, we
consider two discrete lotteries:
Xi=

x1; :::; xN ; p
i
1; :::; p
i
N

i = 1; 2
and their (; 1  )-mixing:
X1(1  )X2=
h
x1; :::; xN ; p
1
1+(1  )p21; :::; p1N+(1  )p2N
i
where  2 [0; 1].
We assume that they have the same certainty equivalent. Hence, we have, for
i= 1; 2:
u (c) = u (c (Xi)) =ui+
PN
n=1 p
i
nE
 
uin

(66)
where:
ui=
PN
n=1 p
i
nu(xn) and u
i
n= u(xn) ui (67)
Now, recall that, by denition, we have:
u(c(X1  (1  )X2))= u1+(1  )u2
+
PN
n=1

p1n+(1  )p2n

(E [u1n + (1  )u2n])
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and, from (66) and (67), we get that:
u(c(X1)) + (1  )u(c(X2))= u1+(1  )u2
+
PN
n=1 p
1
nE
 
u1n

+
PN
n=1 (1  )p2nE
 
u2n

Now, from the betweenness property we get that:
u(c(X1(1  )X2) = u (c (X1)) +(1  )u (c (X2)),
and, consequently:PN
n=1 p
1
nE [u1n]
+(1  )p2nE [u2n]
= (
PN
n=1 p
1
nE [u1n + (1  )u2n])
+(1  )(PNn=1 p2nE [u1n + (1  )u2n])
or, equivalently:PN
n=1 p
1
nE [u1n] + (1  )p2nE [u1n]
+p2n(1  )

E [u2n]  E
 
u1n
 =PNn=1$n()E [u1n + (1  )u2n]
where $n()
def
= (p
1
n+(1  )p2n). Hence, we get the following equality:
PN
n=1$n()(E [u1n]  E [u1n + (1  )u2n])=
PN
n=1 p
2
n(1  )(E
 
u1n
 E  u2n )
or, equivalently:
PN
n=1$n()
 E [u(xn) u1]
 E [u(xn) u]

(1  ) 1=PNn=1 p2n E [u(xn) u1] E [u(xn) u2]

where u= u1 + (1  )u2. Finally we get the following equality:PN
n=1$n() (u2   u1) E 0

u(xn) u1+n(1  ) (u2   u1)

=
PN
n=1 p
2
n (u2 u1) E 0

u(xn) u1+n(u2   u1)

which may be rewritten as:
(u2 u1)F ()= (u2 u1) ()
Since F () cannot be equal to () for any value of , we must have u1 u2= 0:
9.7 Proof of Proposition 14.
The lotteries Xxp and X will be strongly indi¤erent i¤ :
pu(x)= 
pu(x) + pE (u(x)  pu(x)) + (1  p) E ( pu(x))= c(X)
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where:

def
= u (z (X))= E [u (X)]2 [0; 1]
c(X)
def
= u (c (X))=+E [E (u (X) )]2 [u;]
u=+E (1 ) + (1 ) E ( u(x))
The above system can be rewritten as indicated below:
u(x)==p
+pE ((=p) ) + (1  p) E ( )= c(X)
the rst equation is checked i¤ x = u 1 (=p). The second equation has a unique
solution because the function
'(p) =+pE ((=p) ) +(1  p)E ( )
is increasing and maps[; 1] over [u; ]. Indeed we have:
'0(p)= E ((=p) ) E ( ) =pE 0 ((=p) )
= E ( ) +(=p)E 0((=p) )  E ( ) =pE 0 ((=p) )
= (=p)
E 0 ((=p) ) E 0 ((=p) )
and '0(p) is well negative since E(:) is concave, or, equivalently, because E 0(:) is
decreasing.
9.8 Proof of Proposition 15.
If xn+1 were greater than xn, X
xn+1
pn+1 would exhibit FSD dominance over X
xn
pn .
Hence, xn+1 is lower than xn and fxngn2N is a decreasing sequence. It is also bounded
below by a. Consequently, it converges towards a limit ` a. Next, note that the two
strongly indi¤erent simple lotteries Xxnpn and X
xn+1
pn+1have the same expected utility,
i.e., we have:
pnu(xn) = pn+1u (xn+1) +
 
1  pn+1

for n = 0; 1; ::: (68)
and, consequently:
u(w) = pnu(xn)+
Pn
i=1 (1  pi) for n = 1; 2; :::
The above equality implies Sn
def
=
Pn
i=1 (1  pi)  u(w). SincefSngn2N is
an increasing sequence, it converges towards a limit   u(w). As a conse-
quence, Sn Sn 1= (1  pn:)! 0, i.e. pn:! 1. Moreover, since we have: Xxn+1pn+1 
X
xn+1
pn+1  Xxnpn , the sequence of binary lotteries fXxnpngn2N is decreasing and converges
towards X`1= (`). Similarly, fX
xn
pngn2N converges towards X
`
1=  (b `).
We now show that ` = a. The proof is by contradiction. Indeed assume `> a.
Then, since Xxnpn   (`), there exists a binary lottery Xx

n
pn such that ` < x

n < xn,
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andXx

n
pn  (`). Let xn+1 and pn+1 be dened byX
xn+1
pn+1
Xxnpn . Since fX
xn
pngn2N
converges towards  (`), there exists an integer N , such that m  N ) `  xm <
xn+1 and pm pn+1. This implies that X
xn+1
pn+1
should be preferred to the X
xm
pm s and,
consequently, that (`) should be preferred to the X
xm
pm s, what contradicts the fact
that fXxnpngn2N is decreasing and converges towards (`). Hence ` = a and fSngn2N
converges towards =u(w). As a consequence, equality (31) is checked.

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